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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court may disturb the weight given 
to the evidence by the trial court in making findings of fact 
determining that defendants built their fence and deposited 
dirt and debris on plaintiff's property. 
2. On plaintiff's cross appeal, whether the trial 
court applied erroneous legal standards in determining that 
plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages or attorneys' 
fees for defendants' trespass and for defendants' continued 
defense of this action in reliance on a survey establishing the 
trespass. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding plaintiff the costs of a survey found by the trial 
court to be necessary for the determination of the property 
rights of both plaintiff and defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 7, 1985, after the filing of defendants' brief 
here, the trial court entered its Order awarding plaintiff the 
costs complained of in defendants' brief, after having 
announced its decision on this issue by minute entry entered on 
March 6, 1985, previous to the filing of defendants' brief. 
Neither the Order nor the minute entry have yet been made part 
of the record on appeal here. Otherwise, plaintiff does not 
dispute the statement of the case contained in defendants' 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction 
The statement of facts in defendants' brief contains 
only general factual background that is generally not disputed 
by plaintiff. Defendants' statement of facts does not contain 
the factual basis for this appeal, and instead, the "facts" 
relied upon by defendants on this appeal are interspersed 
throughout the argument portion of defendants' brief. Accord-
ingly, this Court should accept the factual recitals in the 
argument portion of defendants' brief for what they purport to 
be—argument, not "facts." 
The facts of this matter are set forth comprehensively 
in the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, 
which include an exhaustive analysis of all evidence presented 
by both plaintiff and defendants. Neither the statement of 
facts nor argument portions of defendants' brief contend that 
there are serious errors or omissions in the trial court's 
findings, except to argue that the trial court gave improper 
weight to surveys offered into evidence by plaintiff that used 
a certain steel pipe as one of the control points or land-
marks. Accordingly, what follows is a summary of the facts 
found by the trial court and not disputed by defendants. 
References to the Record on Appeal will be designated "R." 
followed by the page number in the record, except that refer-
ences to the trial transcript ("Tr." - which commences at 
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R. 234) will be to the transcript page number; references to 
trial exhibits ("Ex" - See R. 6, 94-94A) will be by exhibit 
number; and references to the trial court's Findings of Fact 
("Findings" - which commence at R. 168) will be by paragraph 
number. Copies of the Findings, as well as the trial court's 
Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision" - See R. 116-141) 
and Judgment ("Judgment" - See R. 190-193) are appended to 
defendants' brief on file and will not be separately appended 
here. 
History of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 
and Relevant Surveys 
Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 (hereinafter "Little 
Mountain") and Killyons Subdivision (hereinafter "Killyons") 
are located in Emigration Canyon, Section 27, TIN, R2E, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. Little Mountain lies to the south of 
Killyons. E. G. Swenson, the then Salt Lake County Surveyor, 
platted both subdivisions. In 1909 Swenson recorded the sub-
division plat for Killyons in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
office, and in 1910 he recorded the subdivision plat for Little 
Mountain in that office. Copies of those plats are appended to 
defendants' brief and will not be separately appended here. 
The beginning point for Little Mountain, as stated in the plat, 
is the southwest corner of Section 27. The beginning point for 
Killyons, as stated in the recorded plat of that subdivision, 
is the northwest corner of Section 27. Findings, 1(1; Tr. 45; 
Ex. P-13, P-14. 
Plaintiff (sometimes referred to herein as "Hatanaka") 
is the owner of Lots 39, 40 and the northerly half of Lot 41 in 
Little Mountain. The recorded Little Mountain Subdivision plat 
shows that Hatanaka's property has an east side frontage of 
252.16 feet. Defendants (sometimes referred to herein as 
"Struhs") are the owners of Lots 37 and 38 in Little Mountain 
and Lot 1 in Killyons. Hatanaka's Lot 39 lies directly to the 
south of and shares a common boundary line with the Struhs' Lot 
38. It is the location of this boundary line that is the 
factual issue in dispute. Hatanaka acquired his Lot 39 by 
purchase in 1966. The Struhs acquired their Lot 38 by a quit 
claim deed dated June 27, 1962. Findings; inr 2-4; Tr. 24; 
Ex. P-l. 
When Section 27 was originally surveyed by the Bureau 
of Land Management (hereinafter "BLM") in 1881, the original 
field notes (Ex. P-28) state that a sandstone monument was 
placed at the southwest corner of Section 27. This sandstone 
monument has never been located, although searched for by 
independent surveyors and the Salt Lake County Surveyor's 
office. Also the Little Mountain plat does not refer to such a 
monument, or to the BLM survey. Findings 1fir 1,5; Tr. 111-120, 
241; Ex. P-13, P-14, P-29. 
The original BLM field notes contain calls from the 
southwest corner of Section 27 of five chains east to the road 
and 6.5 chains east to Emigration Creek. The Swenson plat 
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conforms to these same calls in fixing the beginning point of 
Little Mountain. The BLM field notes also show distances along 
the west boundary line of Section 27, north from its southwest 
corner, of two chains to conglomerate rock, four chains to a 50 
foot high wall, 18 chains to the top of a north-south ridge, 40 
chains to a point where a sandstone marker 16" x 9M x 8" was 
set for the west 1/4 corner by which a mound of stones was 
erected, and 80 chains to the corner for Sections 21, 22, 27 
and 28 (the northwest corner of 27) where a limestone monument 
14" x 9" x 6M was set with stated markings and a stone mound 
alongside. Findings, 1f 6; Ex. P-13, P-14, P-28, P-29. 
At some uncertain time in the past, the Salt Lake 
County Surveyor inserted a 6M x 6" cedar post in the ground and 
declared it to be the southwest corner of Section 27. However, 
if the cedar post is used as the beginning point of Little 
Mountain, the entire subdivision is shifted from its actual 
location to the east approximately 107 feet and to the north 
approximately six feet, leaving the homes of some of the owners 
of the west lots of the subdivision outside of, or upon the 
west boundary line of, the subdivision. The use of the cedar 
post as the beginning point of the subdivision would result in 
Hatanaka's house no longer being situated on his property. The 
Salt Lake County Surveyor's office has done no work to locate 
the platted beginning point of Little Mountain or any lot 
corners in Little Mountain and no work in an east-west 
direction to compare the location of the cedar post to the 
location of the southwest corner of Section 27, as identified 
in the original BLM field notes. However, the Salt Lake County 
Surveyor and all parties and witnesses agree that the 6M x 6" 
cedar post does not accurately locate the southwest corner of 
Section 27 or the beginning point of Little Mountain. Find-
ings, 1Mf 7-9; Tr. 135-138; Defendants' Brief at 22. 
The Utah State Department of Transportation (herein-
after "DOT") performed a survey of Emigration Canyon between 
1932 and 1936. The DOT field notes relating to its survey 
incorporate the original BLM notes, and are consistent with 
these notes and the Little Mountain plat, including the calls 
from the southwest corner of Section 27 of east five chains to 
the road and 6.5 chains to Emigration Creek. During the course 
of this survey, the state surveyors found the cedar post which 
had been installed by Salt Lake County and used it strictly as 
a tie to monuments for road stations. Findings, 1MF 10-12, Tr. 
93-120; Ex. P-24 through P-31. 
The DOT survey determined that the beginning point of 
Little Mountain was approximately 100 feet west and six feet 
north of the cedar post. DOT survey Drawing No. G-9 7 (the 
right of way map) located the beginning point of Little 
Mountain in accordance with its survey and the original BLM 
field notes. The procedure used by DOT in locating the 
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beginning point of Little Mountain was that used in locating an 
obliterated monument. The distance from the point of beginning 
of Little Mountain to the road, as shown in the DOT'S right of 
way map, conforms to the distance from the point of beginning 
of the subdivision to the road, as shown on the original 
recorded subdivision plat for Little Mountain. The DOT'S right 
of way map of Little Mountain sets forth the boundary lines of 
the lots of the subdivision based upon the DOT'S location of 
the beginning point of Little Mountain (i.e., approximately 100 
feet west and six feet north of the cedar post). Legal docu-
ments by which the State of Utah purchased and condemned right 
of way property in Little Mountain contain descriptions based 
upon the location of the beginning point of Little Mountain as 
determined and drawn by the DOT in the right of way map. Find-
ings 1f1f 13-16; Tr. 120-140, 161; Ex. P-24 through P-31. 
Use of the Steel Pipe as a Control Point 
The DOT'S right of way map shows a steel pipe of 
unknown origin located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 in 
Little Mountain. The southwest corner of Lot 26 in Little 
Mountain is contiguous to the northwest corner of Lot 25. 
Norman Andreason purchased Lot 26 in Little Mountain (located 
on the east side of the canyon roadway) in September, 1949, and 
the steel pipe was in place at the southwest corner of Lot 26 
at the time of purchase. Since 1951, the land surveying firms 
of Bush & Gudgell, Coon, King and Knowlton, and Larsen & 
Malmquist have made a number of surveys of properties in Little 
Mountain (including surveys of plaintiff's property) utilizing 
the steel pipe as a control point. These surveys have recog-
nized the steel pipe as being located at the northwest corner 
of Lot 25 of the subdivision. Findings, 1f1f 17-19; Tr. 82, 
138-141; Ex. P-16, P-17, P-22, P-23. 
Under these surveys the location of properties in 
Little Mountain fits existing conditions, including the road-
way, houses and other structures (such as the homes of John 
McMillian, Jr., William F, Biggs, Norman Andreason and plain-
tiff Hatanaka), a concrete retaining wall on the west side of 
the roadway (which is tied to the steel pipe in the real estate 
contract pursuant to which Biggs acquired the lower one-half of 
Lot 50 and the upper one-half of Lot 51), and the fence that 
surrounds the property of John McMillian, Jr., encompassing the 
north one-half of Lot 50, Lots 49, 48, 47, 46, 45, 44, 43, 42, 
and the lower one-half of Lot 41. A number of recorded deeds 
conveying property within Little Mountain, including deeds to 
and from Salt Lake County in the late 1940* s and early 1950's, 
utilize the steel pipe as a reference point and identify it as 
being located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 of Little 
Mountain. The steel pipe has been used as a marker for surveys 
in Little Mountain for more than 45 years, including surveys 
performed for John McMillian, Jr., who owns the property 
immediately to the south of plaintiff, and William F. Biggs, 
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who owns the property immediately to the south of McMillian. 
Findings, 1f1f 20-22; Ex. P-52 through P-60. 
All of the above surveys have tied the steel pipe back 
to the cedar post and have determined that the location of the 
cedar post does not conform to the location of the beginning 
point of the Little Mountain subdivision as set forth on the 
recorded plat. These surveys also have determined that the 
Little Mountain beginning point is approximately 107 feet to 
the west and six to seven feet to the north of the cedar post. 
The beginning point of Little Mountain as thus determined 
closely conforms to the location of the subdivision beginning 
point set forth in the DOT'S 1936 survey. In addition, the 
distances from this point to the road and to Emigration Creek 
compare closely to the distances from the southwest corner of 
Section 27 to the road and creek as stated in the original BLM 
field notes. Findings, 1Mf 23-24; Tr. 214-229; Ex. P-28, P-29, 
P-52 through P-60. 
If the distances from the southwest corner of Section 
27 east to the road and creek as identified in the original BLM 
notes are measured from the cedar post, then the road and creek 
would be situated where they are not actually located. If the 
cedar post is used as the beginning point of Little Mountain 
then the northwest corner of Lot 25 would be pushed up the 
canyon 75 to 90 feet from the present location of the steel 
pipe. Findings, 1f1f 25-26; Tr. 214-229. 
In January, 1983, Robert Jones, a licensed surveyor 
employed by Bush & Gudgell, performed a survey for plaintiff 
Hatanaka to determine the location of the boundary line between 
defendants' Lot 38 and plaintiff's Lot 39. In making this 
survey, Jones utilized the steel pipe as the horizontal or 
lateral control point. James Schuchert, a licensed surveyor 
employed by Coon, King & Knowlton, and Carl Larsen, a licensed 
surveyor employed by Larsen and Malmquist, also performed 
surveys for plaintiff which utilized the steel pipe as the 
horizontal or lateral control point. Each of these surveys 
located the disputed boundary line in the same location and are 
also consistent with the original BLM field notes. In perform-
ing these surveys, the surveyors concluded that the steel pipe 
was located at the northwest corner of Lot 25 of Little 
Mountain, as originally platted. Findings, 1f 28; Tr. 189-230; 
Ex. P-39 through P-42, P-61, P-62. 
Carl Larsen, while an employee of Bush & Gudgell, 
performed a survey for defendants Struhs in May, 1962, utiliz-
ing the steel pipe as the horizontal or lateral control point. 
Although stakes were installed by Larsen on the boundary line 
between Lots 38 and 39, no survey plat was made because defen-
dants instructed Bush & Gudgell not to certify the survey. 
Again, this Larsen survey conforms to the BLM field notes. 
Findings, 1f 27, Tr. 302-307. 
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Evidence Regarding The Trespass by Struhs 
In 1979, defendants Struhs installed a chain link 
fence which ran north and south along the easterly line of the 
subdivision lots lying west of Emigration Canyon Road. From 
its southern most point near the west side of Emigration Canyon 
Road, this fence runs in a westerly direction approximately 45 
feet. Defendants did not use the boundary stakes, which had 
been installed for them by Bush & Gudgell in 1962, to determine 
their property line. These stakes established the disputed 
boundary line at the same location as did the surveys performed 
by Bush & Gudgell and Coon, King & Knowlton, for plaintiff 
Hatanaka. Also, in 1984 defendants placed a substantial amount 
of fill dirt on the northerly side of this 45-foot section of 
fence. The bearing of this 45-foot section of fence is S 88° 
30' W, while the bearing on the south line of Lot 38 on the 
original Little Mountain Subdivision Plat is N 79° 08' West. 
Findings, 1Mf 28,30; Tr. 29-32, 39, 44, 57-59. Ex. P-19, P-20, 
P-21. 
Defendants Struhs have asserted that they built their 
house on Lot 37 in 1965, making their determination as to the 
location of their property from "existing land marks and topog-
raphy." However, the building permit and proof of appropria-
tion of water filed by defendants establish that defendants 
built their house on Lot 38 and the lower part of Lot 37, both 
of which they own. These documents show, respectively, 
defendants' house to be only approximately either 40 feet north 
or 25 feet north of the common boundary line between Lots 38 
and 39. Findings, 1f 31; Ex. P-86. 
The survey introduced at trial by defendants Struhs 
was performed by James Stercke, a licensed surveyor. Stercke's 
survey purports to locate the common line between Lots 38 and 
39 in Little Mountain by measurements made from the presumed 
beginning point of Killyons. In performing his survey, Stercke 
assumed that the present Salt Lake County monument at the 
northwest corner of Section 27 was the point of beginning of 
Killyons and that Killyons and Little Mountain were contiguous, 
as originally platted. However, several witnesses testified at 
trial, and defendants' brief admits, that the two subdivisions 
may overlap, rather than being contiguous, with Struhs owning 
the property on both sides of the overlap. Although Lot 1 in 
Killyons lies north of defendants' Lot 37, and the south line 
of Lot 1 and the north line of Lot 37 have the same bearings, 
the two subdivisions have separate points of beginning, making 
it clear that when Swenson surveyed and platted the two sub-
divisions in 1909 and 1910, he did not begin Little Mountain 
where Killyons ended at Lot 1. Findings 1Mf 32, 35; Tr. 238, 
248; Ex. D-88. 
The trial court found that the evidence did not 
establish that the monument used by Stercke as his beginning 
point is located either at the point where the original BLM 
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notes describe the location of the northwest corner of Section 
27, or at the point of beginning of Killyons, as originally 
platted. Stercke's survey is uncertified and Stercke made no 
attempt to locate the beginning point of Little Mountain, or to 
follow the original BLM field notes. Stercke has performed no 
other surveys of any other property in Little Mountain. 
Stercke did not locate the west one-quarter corner of Section 
27 or any of the other section corners he attempted to find. 
Findings, 1fir 33-34; Tr. 248, 448-458; Ex. D-88. 
Stercke performed his survey for defendants in the 
fall of 1983. Defendant Kenneth Struhs was present when 
Stercke installed a stake in the ground at a point Stercke 
believed to be the southeast corner of defendants' Lot 38. 
This stake was placed about 20 feet north of the southeast 
corner of defendants' fence. Stercke advised defendant Kenneth 
Struhs at the time of installing this stake that the stake was 
installed where Stercke believed the southeast corner of Lot 38 
was located. Thus, even according to the survey relied upon by 
Struhs at trial, the Struhs' fence and fill dirt were located 
on Hatanaka's property. Also under Stercke's survey, the road-
way through Little Mountain would be shifted about 50 feet west 
into the west lots of the subdivision and defendants' house 
would be in the platted road. Findings, 1f1f 36, 37; Tr. 465; 
Ex. P-65, P-90. 
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The survey performed for plaintiff Hatanaka by James 
C. Schuchert shows that plaintiff's house is situated 86.4 feet 
from the south line of the north 1/2 of Lot 41 and 64.3 feet 
west of the east line with the north side of the house 134 feet 
from the north line of Lot 39. This survey also shows that 
defendants' chain link fence extends 77 feet south of the 
northeast corner of Lot 39 on to plaintiffs' property. The 
survey performed for plaintiff by Carl Larsen shows that defen-
dants' fence lies about five feet east of the east boundary of 
Lots 37, 38, and 39 and borders the west side of the roadway. 
The distance between the McMillian fence to the south of plain-
tiff's property and the fence line of defendants to the north 
is only 175 feet. At the south end of defendants' fence, the 
fence turns westward into Lot 39 upon a bearing of S 88° 30' 
W. Since the platted south line of Lot 38 has a bearing of N 
79° 08' W, the distance that the fence extends down into Lot 39 
varies from 80 feet where the fence turns westward to 90 feet 
where the fence terminates. Findings 1f 38-39; Ex. P-64, P-65. 
The survey performed for plaintiff by Robert Jones 
shows that defendants' chain link fence runs southward 79 feet 
from the dividing line between Lots 38 and 39 along the west 
side of the roadway and then angles into Lot 39 for a distance 
of 44.9 feet in such a direction that the west end of the fence 
is eight feet north from the south line of Lot 39 or about 92 
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feet south from the north line of Lot 39. Findings, 1f 40; 
Tr. 230; Ex. P-39. 
Also, plaintiff and defendant Kenneth Struhs measured 
the distance of the frontage of plaintiff's land along the 
roadway between the McMillian fence on the south and defen-
dants' fence on the north. This distance was 73 feet short of 
the 252.16 feet of east side frontage contained in plaintiff's 
property, according to the original Little Mountain plat. 
Aside from Stercke's survey, defendants presented no proof as 
to where their lots or their corners are actually located or 
that defendants' east side frontage, as shown on Little 
Mountain plat, will be reduced by giving plaintiff 252.16 feet 
of frontage on the east side of plaintiff's lots commencing 
from McMillian's fence. Findings, 1f 41-42; Tr. 29. 
Accordingly, the trial court found that, M[i]n con-
structing their fence, defendants were more concerned with the 
placement of McMillian's fence and undertook to fence off a 
tract of land they considered their own without regard to 
plaintiff's lots and the east side frontage thereof.'1 
Ultimately, the trial court also found that defendants' chain 
link fence extends along the frontage of plaintiff's Lot 39 by 
at least 73 feet, and in its turn to the west it intrudes into 
Lot 39 for the length of the fence. Findings, 1f 44. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. As to the merits of their appeal, the Struhs 
contend that the trial court erred in failing to relocate (or 
in failing to order the county surveyor to relocate) the spot 
upon which the BLM surveyor erected a sandstone monument in 
1881 to mark the southwest corner of Section 27. However, the 
issue is not where the BLM found the southwest corner of 
Section 27 to be in 1881, the issue is where E. G. Swenson 
commenced Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2 pursuant to the 
subdivision plat he recorded in 1910. This is an issue of fact 
upon which this Court may not substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court. 
Contrary to the cases relied upon by defendants, their 
property rights do not flow from government patent or any other 
deed or grant of land referencing or incorporating either the 
sandstone monument or the BLM survey. Instead, these property 
rights flow from the Swenson subdivision plat, which recites 
that the subdivision commences at the southwest corner of 
Section 27, but which contains no mention of the sandstone 
monument, the 1881 BLM survey, or any other reference point 
used by Swenson in commencing the subdivision at what he 
believed to be the southwest corner of Section 27. 
While the BLM survey is not controlling, it is 
probative, because the Little Mountain Plat on its face 
indicates that Swenson did attempt to locate the beginning 
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point of the subdivision in accordance with where the BLM notes 
described the location of the southwest corner of Section 27. 
In this regard, all of the surveys relied upon by plaintiff 
also relied on the BLM field notes and recreated the BLM survey 
from those field notes, when the sandstone monument referenced 
in the BLM survey could not be found. 
In retracing the BLM survey from the field notes, all 
of these surveyors discovered that the pipe was located at the 
northwest corner of Lot 25, as the lot and the subdivision had 
been platted by Swenson. Since the pipe could be tied both to 
the BLM survey and the Swenson plat, and since the BLM's sand-
stone monument could not be located, the pipe was appropriately 
used for a control point. Plaintiff's surveys were also con-
sistent with the "fit" of other landmarks and improvements 
within the subdivision and were a proper basis for the trial 
court's decision fixing the location of the disputed boundary. 
On the other hand, the survey relied upon by defen-
dants at trial ignored the BLM survey and field notes and was 
tied only to the location of a neighboring subdivision based on 
the mistaken belief that the two subdivisions were contiguous. 
Defendants' survey was also inconsistent with the "fit" of 
Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2. Moreover, even defendants' 
survey showed that defendants' fence and fill dirt were placed 
on plaintiff's property. 
II. On the merits of plaintiff's cross appeal for 
punitive damages and attorneys' fees, the trial court found 
that defendants placed their fence and fill dirt without regard 
for the location of plaintiff's property, and in the face of 
their own surveys showing that the property line was well above 
the area where they had installed their fence. At the very 
least, their conduct was reckless, and the trial court com-
mitted an error of law in failing to award punitive damages in 
light of the Findings of Fact. Similarly, defendants' con-
tinued defense of this action with knowledge that their own 
surveys established the trespass, entitles plaintiff to an 
award of attorneys' fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953) 
for defendants' bad faith and meritless defense. 
III. Finally, defendants appeal from the award of 
plaintiff's costs of a survey found by the trial court to be 
necessary to locate the disputed boundary line. However, the 
order appealed from is not yet part of the record on appeal and 
is, therefore, not yet subject to review. In any event, the 
cost award should be upheld based on the trial court's proper 
exercise of its discretion in finding that the survey was 
necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION - SCOPE OF REVIEW 
The trial court correctly described the issue before 
it in this boundary dispute-trespass case as the credibility of 
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the evidence, primarily consisting of surveys used to determine 
the beginning point of Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2. 
Memo r andum Decision at 3. Thus, in reviewing defendants1 
contention on appeal that plaintiff did not meet his burden of 
proof on this factual issue, this Court must review the factual 
record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff-respondent 
and may not disturb the weight given by the trial court to the 
evidence. See Reimschiissel v. Russell, 649 P. 2d 26 (Utah 
1982); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 P.2d 512 (Utah 1980). 
Defendants' brief incorrectly implies that the burden 
of proof to be met by plaintiff was one of clear and convincing 
evidence. However defendants cite no supporting authority, and 
plaintiff is unaware of any authority for application of any 
burden of proof in this case other than the usual preponderance 
of the evidence standard. The only parties who have the burden 
of clear and convincing evidence are defendants on this 
appeal. Id. Moreover, as will be discussed further below, 
plaintiff's burden at trial was to show the beginning point of 
a privately platted subdivision, not the location of a missing 
governmental monument. 
Defendants' brief is also incorrect in stating that 
the trial court determined the rights of non-parties. The 
trial court was called upon to determine only the property 
rights of the parties before it. This is not a quiet title 
action, and only the rights of plaintiff and defendants were 
fixed by the trial court's determination of the disputed 
boundary and of defendants' trespass. 
II. THE EVIDENCE OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS DETERMINING THE 
DISPUTED BOUNDARY AND DEFENDANTS' TRESPASS. 
The three cases primarily relied upon by defendants in 
their appeal are Barbizon of Utah, Inc. v. General Oil Co., 24 
Utah 2d 321, 471 P.2d 148 (1970); Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 
29 Utah 108, 80 P. 382 (1905); and Cornia v. Putnam, 26 Utah 2d 
354, 489 P.2d 1001 (1971). However, a review of these cases 
reveal that they actually support plaintiffs position instead. 
Defendants rely on Barbizon and Washington Rock for 
the propositions that M[o]fficial government surveys cannot be 
changed in a dispute over boundary lines between individuals,M 
and that government surveys and section corner monuments are 
the "best evidence" in a private boundary dispute. See, Defen-
dants' Brief at 9-12. They rely on Cornia in arguing that the 
trial court failed to distinguish between whether the missing 
BLM monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost" 
or "obliterated." See, Defendants' Brief at 9-10. However, 
the reason this Court found the BLM surveys to be controlling 
in resolving the private boundary disputes in these cases was 
that the sources of title of the respective parties involved 
were federal land patents based on BLM surveys. See, Barbizon 
at 471 P.2d 148 and Washington Rock at 80 P. 385. 
-20-
In the case at hand, the source of both plaintiff1 s 
and defendants' title is private deeds to numbered lots in a 
privately platted subdivision. Here, the recorded subdivision 
plat is the "original'1 survey, since it makes no reference to 
the BLM survey, other surveys, or any government monument. 
Defendants correctly point out that any rights created by 
"official" government surveys can not be altered by subsequent 
private surveys. By the same token, rights created by private 
surveys cannot be altered by inconsistent government surveys, 
as the trial court ruled. See, Memorandum Decision at 22. See 
also, Tr. 146. Thus, even if the county surveyor were to 
replace the missing BLM sandstone monument pursuant to 
§ 17-23-9 Utah Code Ann. (1953), as defendants urge, this would 
have no effect on the rights of the parties under a subdivision 
plat not tied to that monument. Defendants concede as much in 
admitting that the cedar post presently used by the county sur-
veyor to mark the southwest corner of Section 27 does not 
accurately reflect the beginning point of Little Mountain Sub-
division No. 2. See, Defendants' Brief at 22. 
If Swenson had used a commencement point different 
from where the BLM survey found the southwest corner of Section 
27 to be, the Swenson survey would still control, because the 
Swenson survey is the source of both plaintiff's and defen-
dants' title, not the BLM survey. The reason the trial court 
considered the BLM survey at all in this private boundary 
dispute is that the evidence indicated that Swenson used the 
same "calls" (i.e., 5 chains from the road bisecting the sub-
division and 6.5 chains from Emigration Creek) in locating the 
beginning point of his subdivision, as were used by the BLM 
surveyor in locating the southwest corner of Section 27. To 
this extent, Barbizon, Cornia and Washington Rock become rele-
vant in determining the probative value of the respective 
surveys relied upon by the parties here. However, the reason 
for this Court's rejection of the private surveys in those 
cases is because those surveys ignored the government's surveys 
and field notes. By contrast, here all of the surveys relied 
upon by plaintiff (including the DOT survey performed in the 
1930's) used or were consistent with the BLM survey and field 
notes, all of which were in turn ignored by the Stercke 
survey. Defendants' cases establish the probative value of 
plaintiff's surveys and the lack of any probative value of the 
Stercke survey. 
Defendants' description of this Court's analysis in 
these cases of the "best evidence" of a government survey, and 
the distinction between "lost" government monuments and "oblit-
erated" government monuments, is extremely misleading. In 
discussing the "best evidence" of a government survey, these 
cases refer to the best available evidence. If the government 
monuments have not been lost or obliterated then they are 
obviously the best evidence. However, all three of the cases 
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make it very clear that if these monuments cannot be found, as 
here, then the BLM field notes become the "best" evidence. 
This is the evidence relied upon by plaintiff here and ignored 
by defendants. 
Cornia also makes it clear that a governmental monu-
ment is "lost" rather than "obliterated" only if its original 
location cannot be found by use of the government surveyor's 
field notes. If the field notes enable the government survey 
to be re-created, then the monument is "obliterated" rather 
than "lost" and the procedure for re-location is simply to 
re-trace the government survey from the field notes. The trial 
court here expressly found that the DOT surveys, plaintiff's 
surveys introduced at trial and all other surveys relied upon 
by plaintiff followed or were consistent with the BLM survey 
and field notes. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendants' 
contentions that the trial court did not determine whether the 
monument at the southwest corner of Section 27 was "lost" or 
merely "obliterated," and that plaintiff's surveys were unable 
to locate this corner. 
The surveys plaintiff relies upon did not replace the 
obliterated monument because this is the job of the county 
surveyor under § 17-23-9 and because there was no need to do 
so. The steel pipe referred to in all of these surveys was 
tied both to the BLM survey and to the Swenson plat and was 
appropriate for use as a control point instead of the missing 
monument. 
There is nothing in any of the cases cited by defen-
dants to suggest that if the purpose for finding the location 
of an obliterated government monument is to resolve a private 
boundary dispute, that only the county surveyor is empowered to 
perform this task under § 17-23-9. To the contrary, Barbizon, 
Cornia and Washington Rock all indicate that, as here, evidence 
of the original location of an obliterated government monument 
from private surveyors using original government field notes is 
the "best evidence" of government surveys used to find the 
location of private boundaries. Resolution of private boundary 
disputes cannot be made to depend upon the county surveyor's 
performance or nonperformance of § 17-23-9 duties. 
Again, it was only defendants' survey which ignored 
the "best evidence" found in the BLM field notes and instead 
relied upon the false assumption that the Little Mountain and 
Killians subdivision boundaries were contiguous. It was only 
the Stercke survey that ignored the "fit" of all landmarks and 
improvements within Little Mountain Subdivision No. 2, to the 
extent of shifting the location of defendants' own home into 
the platted road. Since even this survey conclusively estab-
lishes defendants' trespass, there is no basis for disturbing 
the weight given to the evidence by the trial court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN FAILING TO AWARD PLAINTIFF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES BASED UPON DEFENDANTS' 
KNOWING TRESPASS. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, not only 
did the trial court find that defendants placed their fence and 
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fill dirt on plaintiff's property, the court also found a 
number of facts showing that defendants acted with knowledge of 
the trespass. These facts are: 
1. A survey ordered from Bush & Gudgell by 
defendants in 1962 showed that the common boundary 
with plaintiff's property was where plaintiff con-
tended it to be. Findings, 1f 27. When defendant saw 
where their survey showed the property line to be, 
they instructed Bush & Gudgell not to certify the 
survey. Id. When defendants installed their fence in 
1979, they ignored the boundary stakes set by their 
own surveyor and located the fence without regard to 
plaintiff's property line. Findings, 1f1f 30, 44. 
2. In building permit and water appropriation 
applications filed in 1965, defendants showed the 
property line to be where staked by Bush & Gudgell in 
1962 rather than where defendants placed their fence 
in 1979. Findings, 1f 31. 
3. Even defendants' own trial survey, performed 
in 1983, showed that defendants' fence intruded on 
plaintiff's property by at least 20 feet. Findings, 
1f 36. When defendants' surveyor specifically informed 
them of this fact in 1983, they continued to defend 
this action on the basis that their fence established 
the property line. Id. 
4. In 1984 defendants compounded their abuse of 
plaintiffs property rights after this action was 
filed, by depositing fill dirt near the fence, knowing 
that the survey they would offer at trial showed that 
the fill dirt was also placed on plaintiff's prop-
erty. Findings, 1f 30. 
Notwithstanding these findings, the trial court 
refused to award punitive damages and refused to award attor-
neys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953) "as a 
matter of law" on the basis that defendants' conduct was not 
"willful and malicious." Tr. 496 et seq. While, unlike 
defendants, plaintiff does not quarrel with the trial court's 
evaluation of the evidence, plaintiff does contend that the 
lower court committed an error of law in failing to apply 
recent decisions of this Court awarding punitive damages based 
on a "reckless disregard" standard. 
In Terry v. Z.C.M. I. , 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), this 
Court held that punitive damages may be awarded against one who 
acts with reckless indifference and disregard of the law and 
his fellow citizens. Defendant Z.C.M.I. was assessed with 
punitive damages for false imprisonment of an alleged shop-
lifter under this standard. The Court referred to the new 
standard as "implied malice" or "malice in law," 605 P.2d at 
327. Cf^, McFarland v. Skaqgs, 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984) indi-
cating that Terry can no longer be applied in false imprison-
ment - shoplifting cases. 
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Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 
1982) applied this standard for punitive damages in a case 
factually similar to the case at hand. In Branch, the plain-
tiff sued his neighbor for trespass, nuisance, and negligence. 
The defendant neighbor, a small oil company, had allowed its 
waste water to seep into the ground, contaminating plaintiff's 
culinary water supply. The jury rendered a verdict in plain-
tiff's favor on the basis of nuisance. In addition to compen-
satory damages, punitive damages were assessed. On appeal, the 
defendant challenged the award of punitive damages, arguing 
that "punitive damages are appropriate only when willful and 
malicious conduct is shown, and that the [Trial] Court erred in 
including the phrase 'reckless indifference and disregard' in 
its instruction on punitive damages," 657 P.2d at 277. This 
Court rejected that argument, finding the trial court's 
"reckless disregard" instruction to be proper. See also, Leigh 
Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) and Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
Even if it is true that the defendants here were 
uncertain as to the exact location of the property line when 
they erected their fence in 1979, they were certain that the 
fence was on the wrong side of that line. They were just as 
certain in 1984 when they deposited the fill dirt, after this 
action was already underway and they had been advised of the 
results of the Stercke survey. At best, such conduct must be 
deemed "reckless indifference" as a matter of law under the 
above cases. Similarly, defendants' have continued to defend 
the trespass claim, both before the trial court and this Court, 
with knowledge since at least 1983 that the survey they would 
offer at trial would itself prove the trespass. Such defense 
must be deemed "without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(1953), as a matter of law, 
IV. THE COST AWARD WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DISCRETION. 
The trial court's cost award is contained in a Minute 
Entry dated March 6, 1985 and subsequent Order dated May 7, 
1985. Neither of these documents are now contained in the 
record on appeal, nor have defendants made any attempt yet to 
designate them as such. 
More important, defendants admit at page 24 of their 
brief that the amount of a cost award is within the discretion 
of the trial court. While this Court's decisions are not 
entirely clear on the limits of this discretion [compare 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1980), relied upon by 
defendants, with Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 
Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961)], any doubts about the 
equitable scope of this discretion should be resolved in the 
trial court's favor. See, Decorso v. Thomas, 89 Utah 160, 50 
P.2d 951, reh. den., 89 Utah 179, 57 P.2d 1406 (1936). 
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The only cost at issue here is the cost of one of 
plaintiff's several trial surveys. As set forth in the trial 
court's May 7, 1985 Order, this particular survey was found to 
have been "necessary" for the trial court's determination of 
the exact location of the common boundary line. Such a finding 
distinguishes this case from Frampton, Stratford v. Wood, 11 
Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80 (1961), and similar decisions pur-
porting to limit the award of costs incurred in trial prepara-
tion. See also, Davis v. Davis, 111 Utah 324, 178 P.2d 394 
(1947). Of course, the reason the survey was "necessary" was 
because of defendants' reckless indifference to the true 
location of the boundary, over-reaching self help, and bad 
faith defenses to the trespass claim, as argued above. See 
also, Findings, 1f1f 19, 27, 18, 30, 31, 36, 44. If there was 
ever a case in which such an award was called for, this is that 
case, especially where the award was made "necessary" by defen-
dants' own misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
While some cases are deceptive in their complexity, 
this case is deceptive in its simplicity. The factual issue 
before the trial court was where E. G. Swenson commenced Little 
Mountain Subdivision No. 2. Knowing from their own surveys 
that they could not hope to prevail on this issue, defendants 
have attempted to mislead both the trial court and this Court 
with sophistry about "lost" and "obliterated" government monu-
ments. These attempts failed in the trial court and must fail 
here as well. 
Plaintiff's evidence regarding the location of the 
subdivision was straightforward, consistent with the legal 
standards argued by defendants, and consistent as well with the 
relevant public and private surveys and the "fit" of the sub-
division in question. It was only defendants' evidence that 
failed to meet the factual and legal standards that they argue 
apply, and even this evidence established defendants' tres-
pass. As the trial court also found, defendants made it 
necessary for plaintiff to incur the cost of a survey to 
resolve the confusion engendered by defendants' knowing 
trespass and faulty evidence. The only error by the district 
court was a legal one in failing to award punitive damages and 
attorneys' fees based on these findings, and upon findings 
showing that defendants' denial of the trespass was known to be 
meritless. 
This Court may not second guess the trial court's 
evaluation of the evidence and exercise of discretion. Accord-
ingly, plaintiff urges that the trial court's judgment be 
affirmed on the issues of trespass, location of the common 
boundary and award of costs. On the other hand, this Court 
must reverse the trial court's legal error in failing to award 
punitive damages and attorneys' fees based upon the findings. 
Accordingly, plaintiff also urges that this Court remand for 
the sole purpose of directing that punitive damages and 
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attorneys' fees, including fees incurred on this appeal, be 
awarded as a matter of law, in an amount to be determined by 
the district court. .'-TT 
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